We analyse three databases of banking crises and investigate their consistency in the identification and timing of crises. We find that there are large and statistically significant discrepancies between the three datasets. We also compare the dating of banking crises according to these databases using information on the number and size of bank failures for four crises for which the timing strongly differs across these databases. We conclude that information on these variables allows determining the timing of banking crises more precisely. On the basis of our findings, we consider the database compiled by Laeven and Valencia to be the most accurate.
Introduction
Due to the worldwide financial crisis there is renewed interest in the causes and consequences of banking crises. In contrast to economic recessions for which a precise definition exists (i.e. two consecutive quarters of negative growth in real GDP), a widely accepted definition of a (systemic) banking crisis is lacking. Most recent research on banking crises uses the following three sources for dating banking crises: Caprio et al. (2005) , Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Laeven and Valencia (2008; 2013) . 1 These databases employ different definitions of a banking crisis. Consequently, there are large and statistically significant differences between these sets of crisis dates. The databases provide different start and/or end dates and as a consequence come up with different lengths of the crises. Events identified as a crisis by one database are frequently not considered a banking crisis by another database. Also the concordance with economic cycles differs considerably. Low GDP growth sometimes precedes the crisis, sometimes follows the crisis or coincides with the crisis. Even though the crisis dates of Reinhart and Rogoff are to a large extent based on those of Caprio et al. there are large differences between both datasets. An example is the dating of the savings and loan crisis in the US, which we will analyse in more detail in this paper (along with three other banking crises These differences in identifying and dating banking crises have potentially significant consequences. The timing of crises is, for instance, instrumental in estimating output losses caused by banking crises. It may also cause ambiguity in determining the causes of crises. For instance, differences in timing may lead to different conclusions regarding the question of whether a crisis was caused by factors within the financial sector or by factors external to it (e.g., a worsening of general economic conditions). Another possible consequence is that early warning models to predict crises may provide unreliable signals if imprecise and inconsistent dates are used.
Authors rely on multiple criteria to determine the occurrence of a banking crisis often in combination with expert judgement. Some have even gone so far as to state that classifying and dating (systemic) banking crises is inherently subjective (Frydl, 1999) . Authors rely on expert judgement in the absence of an independent arbiter, a role the National Bureau of Economic Research plays in identifying economic recessions. When comparing the main databases referred to above, it becomes clear that these expert judgments differ considerably.
1 These databases employ the so-called events methodology to identify banking crises. Von Hagen and Ho (2007) argue that this events methodology may be biased for several reasons. First, such interventions may refer to a few banks having problems rather than the whole banking sector. Second, policy interventions mostly occur when a crisis has a significant impact on the financial system or the economy, which implies that the start of the banking crisis may be identified too late. Finally, not each crisis leads to government interventions as central banks sometimes solve financial problems successfully. Therefore, there may be a selection bias when banking crises are identified based on interventions by government authorities.
The fact that definitions and dates of banking crises differ across studies has been discussed before (cf. Frydl, 1999; Boyd et al. 2009; Babecký et al., 2012) . However, most empirical studies on banking crises have merely noted the differences and opted for one or the other database.
Alternatively, some authors avoid relying on existing indicators of banking crises altogether and introduce alternatives. For instance, Von Hagen and Ho (2007) propose an index based on money market pressure to identify banking crises. Boyd et al. (2009) light on the differences between the most widely used databases of banking crises and enable to date banking crises more precisely. To illustrate our argument, we analyse four banking crises for which the timing strongly differs across these databases.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the definitions used in the literature on banking crises and compares three widely used databases. Section 3 confronts these sets of crisis dates with data on bank failures and bank losses for four crises: the savings and loan crisis in the United States, the banking crisis during the 1990s in Japan, the banking crisis in Norway, and the crisis in Turkey during the late 1990s. The final section offers our conclusions.
Comparing databases of banking crises
The definition of a systemic banking crisis varies considerably across studies. There are common elements to most definitions, such as widespread bank insolvency, but there is no agreement on a precise definition. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) define a banking crisis as a situation of "… financial distress, in which the banking system has negative net worth." This is a somewhat restrictive definition as most crises rarely affect all banks to the same extent. Their list of banking crises ultimately takes into account the extent of the crisis to distinguish between systemic and non-systemic crises. But it relies very much on expert judgement, in particular with respect to the timing of bank insolvency. No specific measure for the proportion of the banks' equity that is destroyed is used to make this distinction. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) point to a lack of information in general and specifically on the mark-to-market balance sheets of banks for this. These authors do not provide a specific criterion to determine the end of a crisis.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) base their identification of banking crises on certain events.
Similar to Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) , they point to a lack of data which prevents the use of a formal definition. 2 Relative stock prices of banks cannot be used as not all banks are listed. Using changes in deposits would miss crises which do not involve bank-runs, while non-performing loans are deemed too unreliable for lack of harmonised accounting rules. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p. 10) therefore settle on two events: "(1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions … and (2) Table 1 ). 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 In conclusion, while consistent definitions matter when comparing crisis dates between different studies (as shown in the comparison of the Laeven-Valencia and Reinhart-Rogoff databases), the extent to which the crisis dates differ even if the databases refer to the same type of crisis is remarkable. Despite the use of expert judgement, the databases considered give very different assessments of the start and length of banking crises. The following part of this study therefore investigates these differences in more detail by zooming in on four specific banking crises.
Dating banking crises on the basis of bank failures and bank losses

Data
In order to investigate the accuracy of the crisis dates from the three databases compared above, we have compiled data to reconstruct what in our view are the most important aspects of a systemic banking crisis, namely that a significant number or proportion of the banks fail and/or that a significant proportion of the banking's sector equity is destroyed by losses. Bank failures materialise in a number of ways. Banks either fail and are liquidated completely or the bank or its assets are in some form assimilated (merged or taken over) by either a special purpose 'bad bank', such as the Resolution and Collection Corporation in Japan, or by another commercial bank with or without government assistance. If banks are liquidated, merged or taken over, we rely on the estimates of the losses provided as share of the banking sector's equity. Another related measure is the proportion of the banking sector's assets represented by the failed banks. In discussing the crises, we apply a threshold for the latter two measures, but readers may apply other thresholds if they prefer to do so.
The threshold used is 10% for both the losses of failed banks as a proportion of the banking sectors' equity and the proportion of the banking sectors' assets represented by failed banks.
The banking sector does not always consist of uniform types of institutions. We try to adhere as much as possible to a definition of a bank as a depository institution, in the sense that it takes deposits from the general public. This implies that our analysis does not cover other financial institutions when they are not considered depository institutions. Investment banks are, for instance, not included, as they are not depository institutions or bank holding companies (although after the subprime crisis most investment banks converted to banks). Our analysis also does not cover specialised lending institutions, such as the Jusen, which played an important role in the crisis in Japan, and the mortgage companies which played a similar part in Norway´s crisis. We have not limited our analysis to domestic banks, but include foreign banks in our analysis as most banking sectors have both domestic and foreign banks. Finally, most countries' banking sectors consist of a wide variety of general banks and specialised banks with either a regional or a national presence. In our analysis, we only consider the banking sector as a whole even though a crisis may disproportionally affect a subsector (as was the case in the savings and loan crisis in the US).
We rely on datasets which have not yet been widely used in analysing banking crises:
financial accounts data for the banking sector as a whole or aggregate balance sheet data either drawn from monetary statistics or provided by the supervisory authorities 3 . Both sources provide macroeconomic data encompassing the whole banking sector of a country. The main difference between both sources is that the financial accounts data are part of a fully consistent economy-wide data set and monetary statistics are an independent set of data. Monetary statistics are, however, usually the most important source for the compilation of the bank data in the financial accounts. They can therefore be regarded as a valuable substitute if financial accounts data is absent. Another advantage of these sources is that data are compiled according to internationally harmonised guidelines. The availability and the comparability of data between countries has greatly improved in recent years, especially in Europe as harmonised data was a prerequisite for the preparation of monetary policy under EMU.
Increased cooperation between countries under the direction of international organisations, such as the UN, the IMF, the OECD, Eurostat and the ECB, has greatly increased the acceptance of common statistical standards. However, the historical data is often less harmonised but for the purpose of our study international comparability is not a particular problem, since we combine data from one and the same country only and not across countries.
The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s in the United States
We analyse the savings and loan ( 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Savings and loan associations S&Ls and commercial banks 25% 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Savings and loan associations S&Ls and commercial banks Threshold
Crisis dates: Reinhart and Rogoff 1984 Caprio et al. 1988 12% 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Savings and loan associations S&Ls and commercial banks Threshold Crisis dates: Reinhart and Rogoff 1984 Caprio et al. 1988 Laeven and Valencia 1988 In late 1988 and 1989 the S&L losses increased dramatically (see Figure 5 ). During both February and March 1989, 20% of the equity of savings and loan institutions (expressed as percentage of total equity of the S&L sector) was destroyed by failures. But since the savings and loan sector made up only a quarter of the equity of all depository institutions, in terms of equity of the banking sector as a whole the effects were more limited and never reached our indicative threshold of 10% of equity per month.
The analysis of the assets of failed institutions as a proportion of the total banking sectors' assets, as presented in Figure 6 , suggests that failures were at no time pervasive enough for the crisis to qualify as systemic. To begin with, most of the failures were limited to savings and loan institutions.
Additionally, at the height of the crisis, in March 1989, the failure of 176 banks and savings and loan associations represented USD 61.3 billion, or just 1.3% of total assets of the banking sector. Even among the savings and loan associations, our indicator reaches a maximum of only 3.6% in February 1990.
We conclude that the S&L crisis should not be considered as a systemic banking crisis.
Comparing our analysis with the dating of the S&L crisis in the three databases considered, our analysis is closest to that of Laeven and Valencia, who date the crisis to 1988 only, although our analysis suggests that the height of the crisis was in 1989.
Japan's banking crisis of the 1990s
We next apply our method to probably one of the most often investigated crises, the banking crisis in Japan of the 1990s. The three databases again differ markedly in their classification and timing of the crisis in Japan. Caprio et al. (2005) For our analysis we have taken information from the annual reports of the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ) and compiled a list of failed institutions along with the financial assistance they received for the years 1991 to 2010. Somewhat different from the US data, the data from the DICJ concerns the amount of assistance and not the losses estimated. Nevertheless, as the assistance is aimed at covering losses and replenishing equity capital, the method applied to the US data is applicable here as well. We collected data on the number of failed institutions (see Figure 7) and the losses (proxied by the financial assistance provided) as a proportion of equity of the whole banking sector (see Figure 8) . Unfortunately, the DICJ does not provide information on the total assets of the failed banks. We therefore could not analyse failures by the proportion of assets represented by failed banks. Equity for the whole banking sector is taken from the monetary statistics of the Bank of Japan. Unfortunately, this series only starts in October 1993. As there were only two small failures in the years 1991 and 1992, this arguably will not affect the outcomes of our analysis. 25% 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Losses Threshold
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Norway's crisis in the 1980s and 1990s
While the United States and Japan have large banking sectors with a large number of banks, many European countries have more concentrated banking sectors. In order to investigate how our method works out in these countries, we also investigate the Norwegian banking crises during the 1980s.
Again, the three databases differ in dating this crisis. Caprio et al. (2005) date the crisis from 1990 to 1993 and classify it as systemic. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) , the crisis runs from 1987 to 1993, while Laeven and Valencia (2013) For our own analysis, we could not rely on data on losses or failures from an official supervisory agency as Norway's banks had instituted a private deposit insurance fund. We therefore rely on studies documenting the crisis extensively, such as Moe et al. (2004) , specifically their appendix B. We have taken the data on official support, like in the case of Japan, as a proxy for the losses of banks receiving the support. We compared losses with equity using data for commercial and savings banks from the statistical office of Norway. We have not found data on the 13 bank failures that occurred between 1988 and 1990. According to Moe et al. (2004, p. 5) , in those years "13 small and some regional medium-sized banks failed, mostly savings banks. The size of these banks did not yet qualify to call it a systemic crisis."
The results of our analysis are presented in Figure 9 . We refrained from presenting a figure on the number of failures, since after 1990 only four banks were involved. Applying the same method as for the US and Japan suggests a crisis from December 1991 to April 1992. That we find a start date two months later than that of Laeven and Valencia is explained by the fact that we use the date the actual support measures were executed instead of the announcement date. 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Losses Threshold
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Turkey's crisis in the late 1990s
As we also wanted to apply our approach to an emerging market economy, we chose the crisis in Turkey at the beginning of this century as our final case study. Caprio et al. (2005) As for the other countries, this data was then compiled into a monthly time-series for losses.
Besides capital injections to replenish capital, most banks were temporarily exempted from certain capital and reserve requirements, while some were also refinanced by issuing bonds. In other cases, deposits at the central bank were released and reserve requirements suspended. This complicates the assessment of the official support measures, since they are a mix of recapitalisations and provision of additional 'emergency' liquidity. The documentation of the SDIF also does not provide sufficiently detailed information on these liquidity measures to include them in our calculations. We have thus concentrated on the accumulated losses.The results for Turkey are presented in Figures 10 and 11 . 
Conclusions
Our comparison of three widely used databases on banking crises has shown that these databases differ significantly from each other. Consistent definitions matter when comparing crisis dates between different studies as shown in the comparison of the Laeven-Valencia database of systemic crises and the Reinhart-Rogoff database which does not make a distinction between systemic and nonsystemic crises. Still, the extent to which the crisis dates differ even if the databases refer to the same type of crisis is remarkable. Despite the use of expert judgement, the databases considered give very different assessments of the start and length of banking crises.
Our investigations of four crises -the United States savings and loan crisis during the 1980s, Japan's banking crisis of the 1990s, Norway's banking crisis during the early 1990s and Turkey's crisis around the turn of the century -have shown that quantitative data on bank failures and losses suffered by failed banks (or alternatively on official assistance provided) can help to identify and date these crises more precisely. Our evidence suggests the database of banking crises compiled by Laeven 
